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Abstract 
A proposal for a recursive understanding of 
Practice 
Comrnunication Understanding 
Perturbations (noise) enter a process 
from its embodyment or the movement 
to a subordinate order of recursion 
The unfolding of understanding into 
its embodym~nt in pr~ctic~ or mo~ing 
to a superordinate order of recursion 
-L 
Two constructions A and B interacting or 
comparing the~elves ~r: t~e medi~m 
of th-eir embodyment. Understanding 
and practice exemplify such constructions 
上
( ν 
and what happens if understanding does not enter comparisons of human communication 
(theories ). 
l 
1 am responding to the two Forum artic1es on "comparative theory" in 
Communication Theory 1.1. 
To begin, let me say that 1 have always gained new insights from being 
communicatively involved with unusual people and groups or by experiencing 
cultures different from my own. It can broaden one’s horizon and relativise one’s 
own perspectives. 1 am therefore intrigued by proposals to emich communication 
theories through the systematic application of appropriate comparative 
methodologies. But, 1 am also worried, and this paper is largely motivated by the 
fear, that the epistemological assumptions built into the language used for such 
comparisons may frustrate thεse promises and fuel instead an intellectual 
imperialism which consists in privileging human communication theories that deny 
those theorized therein the ability to construct, understand, and communicate 
theories of their own. Such theories can bring forth cognitively disabling 
technologies and unwittingly institute instruments of oppression that are all the 
more persuasive as nobody seems to assume responsibilities for them. 
Clearly, the appropriateness of any comparative methodology is intricately 
linked to the nature of the objects being compared, here to theories and practices of 
human communication, which invariably entail conceptions of human participation. 
1 agree with Brenda Dervin when she writes "that we have failed to develop 
powerful approaches to comparative theory and this failure … (lies) in the very 
nature of the analytic we are now using" and "how we conceptualize ... the 
communicating human" (1991:60-61). Hεr paper seeks to affect a shift from 
comparing entities to comparing processes. 1 hope to take the idea of a comparative 
methodology one step further by proposing a discourse based method, a grammar or 
an epistemological framework not only for the twin problem of constructing 
communication theories comparatively and of making appropriate comparisons 
among them communicable, but also for enabling human participation at the same 
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time. 1 shall do this in the form of several propositions that 1 hope will avoid the 
intellectual imperialism feared. To be honest, by working through these 
propositions one by one, 1 myself am surprised about the conclusions to which they 
led. It could mean the need for a radical reformulation of our communication 
theoretical and comparative efforts, including some of my OWll. Whether they are 
true or not, if they stimulate conversation about communication (theory), then they 
will have proven themselves viable in their very own terms. 
One 
To begin with, the common meaning of "comparison," "com" = together and 
’ψar" = equal would rendεr "comparison" = an act of sorting out likenesses (and by 
implication differences) among objects brought together or this purpose. Consistent 
with this etymology, and speaking about social systems as the objects of his concern, 
Majid Tehranian suggests in his papεr that comparative theory be based on three 
prenus 
common to all systems, and (c) that the uniqueness of any social system can best be 
appreciated by comparing it with what it has in common with others" (1991 :44). 
This description invokes the image of overlapping sets of features, like in a Venn-
diagram, with the additional requirement that the conjunction of all sets must not be 
empty. This superficially innocent conceptualization, which rules out that social 
systems could be related to each other by Wittgensteinian family resemblances, is 
common indeed. What 1 wish to point out here is the objectivist presuppositions 
built into these prernises as stated and practiced. The features, found to be either 
unique or shared, are said to be features of the objects (systems) being compared and 
these features as well as the objects that possess them reside entireψ outside of their 
observers or exist independent of them. In fact, the observer making the comparison 
( enacting the proposed comparative theory) is nowhere recognized in these features 
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To overcorne the objectivist view expressed in the above prernises let rne 
suggst rny first proposition 
Commonalties and differences arise in an observer’s Ianguage. 
Indeed, all cornparisons presurne a conceptual systern or a space into which various 
objects can be placed. There is nothing "objective" about such a space. Spaces 
always are an observer’s construction and it is within such inventions that objects 
acquire cornrnonalties and differences that are of interest to that obseπer or her 
cornrnunity of peers. Thus, cornparisons take place in sorneone’s understanding and 
rnanifest thernselves in her lan밍lage. An 0비ective "re떠ity" knows neither 
sirnilarities nor differences. 
I believe creating a suitable language for particular cornparisons is precisely 
what Tehranian does, albeit unwittingly, for exarnple, when he constructs a rnatrÏx 
out of two rather abstract variables, one consisting of four "cornrnunication and 
control continuities and discontinuities" and the other of three kinds of "social 
processes," whose cells enable hirn to distinguish various cornrnunication theories, 
or, when he proposes a two-dirnensional space (surface) for cornparing (literalψ in 
terrns of the orthogonal coordinates invented for this purpose) different 
developrnent policies. To bε clear, what bothers rne is not the unquestionably 
illurninating terrns chosen for these cornparisons but the implicit clairn that they 
have nothing to do with the authors' own conceptions and interests in bringing forth 
both the objects being cornpared and the results of these comparisons. Maybe, in 
trying to avoid "ethnocentrisrn" (1991:45), Tehranian seerns to go overboard towards 
an objectivisrn that paints invariant features on the objects being cornpared and 
conveniently projεcts the scientist’s responsibilities for these features on their 
presurned "nature." My first proposition suggests, it is not the 。이iects that are same or 
di￦'rent by themselves, it is the language used by someone that makes them so and this 
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someone cannot be relieved o[ the responsibility o[ having constructed them αs such. 
Moreover, and 1 rnight add what 1 will address below, sarneness and difference are 
not the only products of cornparisons. 
T\1\'0 
In general, 1 do not wish to decide for others what cornrnunication is or ought 
to be, what distinguishes a systern that εrnbodies cornrnunication frorn one that does 
not, etc., for this would settle in an a priori rnanner what we wish to understand 
through cornparisons of different observations of it. To express this attitude, let rne 
sirnply s0': 
Everything said is communicated to someone understanding it as such. 
With this second proposition, 1 arn neither suggesting that all cornrnunication 
involves a language (one obviously can say sornething in pictures and cornrnunicate 
by touch). Nor that cornrnunication can only be with sorneone other than oneself 
(notes taken and reread by sorneone can be seen as cornrnunications to one’s later 
self), not even that a listener rnust be accurate in assessing a speaker’s intentions. 1 
arn sure, everyone who has travelled abroad will have e)φerienced talking to a 
stranger who seerns to have no cluε as to what one says but clearly understands that 
one wants to cornrnunicate sornething. 1 arn rnerely suggesting here that the εvent of 
sornething being said, rnust be understood by someone (even if it is only the speaker 
herself) as being said else nothing is said for anyone, and that the one who 
understands it as such thereby constructs her own participation in a process of 
cornrnunication, whatever this construction rnay be. 
In the above, 1 use "said" or "saying sornething" as a rnetaphor of all kinds of 
hurnan practices. 까lere is not just linguistic but also non-linguistic behavior. There 
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is not just speaking but also writing, designing all kinds of artifacts, etc. All of these 
are here considered practices. 
Also, 1 seem to be using understanding and constructions interchangeably, 
but 1 do wish to emphasize with them two different aspects of cognition. To me, 
understanding implies the feeling of being in touch with one’s world, the confidence 
that one’s cog띠tive constructions are affordζd by it, work alright or fit one’s 
practices. In contrast, construction emphasises the created or invented nature of 
cognition in a particular experiential domain. Constructions can become manifest 
in language and the consequences of their practice can contribute to understanding. 
Moreover, the proposition considers untenable any claim insinuating that 
saying, conveying, communicating or even doing something could bypass human 
understanding. It follows that there can be no text, no discourse, no language and in 
fact no-thing without someone recognizing it as such. In a way, the proposition turns 
Watzlawick et al ’s first axion of communication "one cannot not communicate" 
(1967:49) around by shifting the position taken from that of an author and 
instrumental actor to that of a listener and sεlf-declared participant in the process 
Indeed, one never can communicate with someone who fails or refuses to 
understand what one says or does as communication. The observer’s conceptions 
are decisive here 
To me, understanding and practice form an irreducible circular unity, a reality 
that resides neither entirely in someone’s head, as solipsists hold true, nor entirely 
outside of 따 obseπer， as objectivists claim it to bε， but in the dynamic fit between 
them. We always act (or better see us acting) in our own understanding and we seek 
understanding when something does not seem to work out in practice, leaving 
everything outside the circular unity to the unknown. Even the distinction between 
understanding and practice is drawn in our (my) understanding. 
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Accordingly, it is not only impossible to speak about our own practice 
without understanding it as such, we also are constitutionally prevented direct access 
to someone else’s understanding. Understanding someone else’s understanding is 
explaining what that someone says or does, her practice, in ways coherent with our 
own understanding. Thus, the claim of understanding someone embraces her 
practice and our construction of how she conceives what and while she is practicing 
what we thereby explain. Understanding and practice establish two complementary 
perspectives and assign different responsibilities for the observations on others. 
Understanding our own or someone else’s understanding embeds 
understanding in itself and makes understanding a recursiveψ self-embedding 
phenomenon. This is not the casε for practice. The recursion does not stop with 
distinguishing in our understanding between our own and someone else’s 
understanding and practice. It is a theoretically endless process and illustrated in 
the above abstract. There is no escape into a real world outside of understanding it as 
such 
1 might add herε that the distinction bεtweεn understanding and practice 
does not lead to any kind of dualism, whether between mind and body or between 
language and 0비ects existing independent of their descrψtlOn. 돼is is not to say 
that the proposition precludes the possibility of someone constructing a dualistic 
world and behaving accordingly. The proposition merely does not demand such a 
world and the recursion need not be infinite. 
댔 돼 
The axiom that we always act in concert with our understanding of the 
situation we (conceive to) act in can be extended to human communication as well. 
1 take human communication to manifest itself in some observable form of co-
ordination of human behavior, a braiding of individual practices, a dance if you 
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wish, that can not do without its participants seeing each other, respecting each 
others identities or selves and understanding what they do in concert with and in 
expectation of each other, each in their own terms. Let me be more specific and 
propose: Human 
communication resides in the unfolding of communication 
constructions by and of selves and others inlo intertwined practices. 
On thε surface, the proposition seems obvious. 1 wish to point out here that it does 
not imply a particular definition of communication (for example, as the transmission 
of information, as the control of an effect, or as the maintenance of a relationship). 
It merely says where communication resides and proposes a skeleton, a frame or a 
grammar into which participants can freely insert their own understanding of it and 
of each other. It also does not require that the communication constructions 
individuals enact be shared or have a따thing in common with each other (like the 
notion that communication presupposes agreement on rules, a shared language or a 
common symbol repertoire). In fact, such and similar requirements would bring 
objectivism right back into the picture and render individual cognition irrelevant or 
meaningless in understanding human communication. In contrast to objectivist 
accounts, my third proposition symmetricaIly expands the second to others by 
suggesting that comlηunicators can not very well position themselves as communicators 
in their own communication constructions without acknowledging other communicators 
and their respective constructions of each other. 
It is the simultaneous unfolding, acting out, testing for the coherences and 
subsequent reconstruction of these separate constructions (of how communication is 
individuaIly constituted for them) into braided indi띠dual practices that makes 
possible for its participants to observe their own involvement as interactive and their 
behavior as interdependent. 1 am suggesting that only through such interwoven 
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engagements with others can participants come to appreciate the consequences of 
communication constructions substantially different from their own. 
To make the point in yet another way, 1 obviously do not need to see myself 
as communicating with a stone precisely because 1 do not have to consider the 
stone’s understanding of itself, much less of myself, when seeking to understand how 
the stone either responds to my kicking it or why it comes in my way through other 
causes. Here, causal explanations and the attribution of invariant properties are 
perfectly appropriate and an objectivist stance may not unduly harm the object 
being observed, compared or described as such (although from an ecological 
perceptive, this objectivist position may be questioned, even when it involves 
stones). In contrast, what marks much of our interest in understanding other fellow 
beings as humans is their cognitive autonomy, their ability to understand in their 
very own terms language, themselves, other fellow beings and the circumstances 
they see themselves as acting in, an understanding that is inherently creative, invεnts 
its own modes of operation and can, at least in principle, be appreciably different 
from anyone’s understanding including mine. Understanding, whether stones or 
fellow human beings, always requires one to act out, to test and reexamine one’s 
involvement with them. Granting others the same cognitive abilities one claims for 
oneselfin understanding them (see myethi않1 imperative in Krippendorff, 1989:88), 
is not the same as assunring that these others think alike, act alike and live in the 
same world. The assumption of the latter, although often practiced for various 
social reasons, would stifle human communication and, when built into scientific 
theories, prevents its understanding. 
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Four 
Note, by saying "everything said is communicated to someone ... ," 1 am saying 
something about saying something and, by implication, communicating about 
communication, which is what human communication theory is to do. Also note 
that even though 1 can use quotation marks to distinguish mention and use in 
writing, saying something and saying something about saying something takes place 
in the same language. Evidently, "saying" is autological or applicable to itself and 
comes quite natural to ordinary speakers of a language. Similarly, communication 
and communication about communication or meta-communication does not require 
meta-meta communication to be entangled (as logical positi띠sts would require, but 
anyone’s recursive understanding of communication. The simple fact that 
communication theory too must be communicated to someone, understanding it as 
such exhibits the self-reference involved in understanding communication. 
This is not so in all domains of scientific inquiry. For example, theories in 
the natural sciences have nothing to say about the language in which they are cast 
and leave the processes through which they are communicated among peers 
unproblematized. To most natural scientists, language seems to be transparent (like 
water may be for fish). As long as this is so, there can be no phys파 of physics, no 
biology of biology. But we certainly can conceive of a sociology of sociology, for 
example, and communication about communication makes sense to us as well. This 
self-reference makes human communication fundamentally different from the 
objects of the natural scienc앉. The language for comparisons referred to in the first 
proposition is part and parcel of the communication processes or theories being 
compared. 1 am therefore suggesting that constructions of human 
communication theories must be able to constitute themselves 
in the veη practices they c1aim to describe. 
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To constitute sornething is to define sornething frorn within what is being 
defined. 1 arn clairning this to be so for thεories of hurnan cornrnunication. When 
anobseπer understands the intertwined practices of others as processes of 
cornrnunication, cornrnunicates a communication theory of their practices to thern 
who, influenced by what they hear being said about thern, rnodify their practices 
according to their individual understanding of it, which in turn gives rise to new 
observations and a rnodified understanding on the part of the observer, then the 
process closes in on itself. The practical consequences of such a theory become the 
ground for its (re )forrnulation and the iteration of this process converges to an 
eigen-forrn, a fit between each participant’s understanding of what is being said and 
the simultaneous practices they engage in relative to each other. During such 
iterations, theories of cornmunication either prove thernselves viable by adjusting 
thernselves in the face of perturbations arising frorn their practical embodirnents 
(see above abstract) or disappear. The well known self-fulfilling prophesies 
exernplify the kind of convergence that any theory can set in rnotion. It is a process 
in which the definience brings forth its own definiendurn. 
Five 
Now, let rne get cornparisons back into the picture. Elsewhere, 
(Krippendorff, 1984) 1 suggested that constructions of cornrnunication bridge the 
consequences of at least three kinds of cognitive distinctions. (1) distinctions arnong 
the cornrnunicators involved, rninirnally creating one’s own identity relative to 
various others, (2) distinctions among the things being said and done or felt whether 
these bring forth different messages, speech acts, states of rnind or beliefs associated 
with each participant and (3) distinctions in time that allow cornrnunication to be 
recognized as an unfolding process. These distinctions probably are grounded in the 
most basic constructions of how we can live with each other as hurnans. 
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1 believe Dervin’s idea, that communication means the c10sing of a variety of 
existing gaps, comes c10se to this notion except that 1 cannot see gaps as existing 
independentofanyone’s understanding of them or "gappiness (as) an assumed 
’constant’ of the human condition" (1991:62), but as resulting from someone’s 
drawing of and acting on distinctions in which already held constructions of reality, 
language and the medium of others’ participation play important roles. Humans 
draw their own distinctions on top of distinctions drawn previously and develop their 
own explanatory constructions (inc1uding verbally stated theories) to overcome the 
violence these distinctions bring forth in their own understanding. 1 am suggesting 
that the unity of drawing distinctions and designing bridges, decomposing and 
reconstructing or analyzing and synthesizing always is dedicatεd to the preservation 
of human understanding and the fact that nobody can be forced to understand 
something α5 intended, as it exists or α5 it should be and the fact that noboψ can 
directly observe someone else's understanding attests to the cognitive autonomy of the 
individuals involved in communication. Understanding, always is anyone’s own and 
human communication can not be anything but voluntary. 
Moreover, proposition one suggests that comparisons are made within a 
cognitively realized space whose distinctions are continuously drawn and re-drawn 
by and in the language being used and should hence be considered a step towards 
understanding. Let me therefore propose: 
The cognitive operations of re-creating spaces, re-drawing distinctions, 
re-constructing, re-examining, comparing and testing the coherences 
among (communication) constructions are dedicated 
to the preservation of human understanding. 
This proposition focuses attention both to the operational nature of human 
understanding and its maintaining the coherences among various constructions and 
the practices they inform, here in communication with others. To say understanding 
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preseπes itself presumes the possibility of its disturbance, for example, by the 
experience of unpredictable consequences, especially from interacting with others, 
or from various forms of internal (blind) variations, for example, creative 
decomposition and reconstruction processes. It also presumes that understanding 
can be reinstated once distrubed. Comparing cognitive constructions is a move in 
this direction. 
Six 
Taking theory to be an observer’s linguistic construction that coheres 、띠th 
her own understanding and assuming (with proposition three) that understanding 
communication entails the understanding by and of the communicators involved, 
specifically their communication constructions, communication theory becomes an 
observer’s explanatory account of the intertwinεd practices of participants whose 
individual communication theories must be inscribed in it. It does not matter here 
whether the inscribed theories are narrated as such by the participants or 
reconstructed, based on that observer’s understanding of the participants' 
understanding of their own communication practices. In fewer words, 1 am 
suggesting that human communication theory must recuηively inscribe the 
coαmmt 
Furthermore, keeping in mind (proposition four) that human communication 
theory must be able to constitute itself or prove its viability in the practice it informs 
and (proposition five) that comparisons inevitably are involved in processes of 
maintaining understanding in human communication, particularly by comparing (the 
theorists’ constructions of) the communication constructions participants seemingly 
enact, 1 propose: 
Comparisons of communication theories call for a process 
of conversation among those who practice them. 
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This proposition suggests that a methodology for comparing communication 
theories follow the same recursive grammar as the communication practices each of 
these theories must be able to describe. Ordinary communicators too are engaged 
in a continuous testing of coherences, redrawing of various distinctions, reexarnining 
the consequences of unfolding their communication constructions. Comparing in 
one’s own understanding the communication constructions (or communication 
theories) different participants appear to practice is one of these cognitive 
procεsses， εxcεpt that the issue here no longer is one of establishing commonalties 
and differences (which would follow the dictates of objectivist traditions) but one of 
exploring within a suitable la맨lage whatd(￦Tent coηstntctions or theories m뺑tdo 
to each other when practiced together. To appreciate different constructions of 
communication (theories), to prove their viability in joint practices requires 
conversation, dialogue, non-coercive forms of interaction, mutual accommodation, 
inviting others into onε’s own constructions of reality while caring for their cog띠tive 
autonomy. The difference between social scientists and everyday practitioners of 
communication may not lie in how they get involved with each other but in different 
practices of accounting for their cognitive operations to peers, in different 
discourses (methodology versus meta-communication) within which they are 1εd to 
maintain different coherences and, 1 would add, in radically pursuing human 
understanding, not subrnission. 
Seven 
With the above propositions in mind, let me finally address Tehranian’s 
question "is comparative communication theory possible or desirable?" (1991:44). 
Obviously, it always is possible to chose or invent a language that brings forth 
commonalties, even among objects from seerningly incommensurate empirical 
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domains. (Hickory, communication, Tibet and 1 have not only the letter "i" in 
common but also that they all occur in this sentence). Whether particular 
comparisons make sense depends on whether a discourse brings the fruits of such 
comparisons to someone’s attention. So, my answer to the first part of the question 
is an unequivocalyes. 
In proposing to answer the second part of the question, 1 am effectively 
adopting its presupposition, that there is no socially neutral theory. Every theory 
claims to be about something and engages those understanding it, theoreticians, 
practitioners and students alike, in albeit different practices that create, reproduce, 
manipulate, utilize or dirninish the phenomena they see addressed. Only in the 
dualist world construction of objectivism is theory neutral, divorced 감ompractice 
and independent of anyone’s understanding it. We know so well that theoretical 
advances in atomic physics led to the construction of atom bombs and nuclear 
reactors which in turn posed additional theoretical problems and thus set in motion 
a process of reconstructing portions of our world. A predictive theory of attitude 
change rnight have been born within an acadernic environment but, if it enables 
advertisers, political activists or psychologists to mold the attitudes of particular 
groups of people, such a theory undoubtedly will give practical support to 
instrumental intents and induce the social change it can support. Communication 
theories are no exceptions. They inform a variety of communication practices, 
whether they come to be embodied in communication technologies, in social 
organizations or in the communicative practices of individuals. The desirability of a 
comparative methodology depends on which social practices are fostered by the 
theories it encourages. 
In what follows, 1 will describe one condition in which theory constructions 
and comparisons may not need to involve the human understanding by subjects and 
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examine some of the social consequences of three failures to not invoke such an 
understanding. 
(1) 까le scientific observer is concerned with phenomena of human behavior 
subjects either (la) are not conscious of, like phenomena outside the range of 
human perception, universal constraints or unreflected habits of thought and action, 
(lb) may understand but can not vary for effects, like their own biological 
constitution, physicallaws or unconditioned reflexes, or, (lc) have no desire or 
capability to understand, like knowledge far removed from one’s interest or buried 
in a language too cumbersome to learn. Indeed, neither of these phenomena can 
serve ordinary human communication well. This is not to deny that scientific 
discourse and instrumentation, could not give rise to sophisticated communication 
technologies, like radiowaves did, or causally effect humane existence, like 
techniques of genetic manipulation can. As long as these manifestations are 
construed as residing outside the communicators' reach, as unaffected by their 
cognition, or as merely physically mediating betweεn thεm， objectivist methods of 
comparisons and theory construction might be justifiable in such constructions of 
reality. Indeed, the natural sciences have been notorious in creating obscure 
technicallanguages that prevent subjects from understanding what this means for 
them. Whether this practice is ethical in the social domain is another question. 
(2) The observer either αeates or attends to situations in which subjects find 
it desirable or appropriate to suspend their own judgement, render their behavior 
reactive to stimuli, perform functions programmed from the outside andjor take no 
responsibilities for their own practices. Such situations arε typical of controlled 
experiments, dεsigned to generate data that are conveniently analyzable in causal or 
correlational terms and common also in many industrial settings in which workers 
are required to perform albeit cornplex but entirely mechanical or algorithmic tasks. 
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Theories created to account for such situations attest to the su비ects’ 
willingness to comply with given instructions or to apply to themselves the cognitive 
constraints their own dεfinition of the situation demands, but say litt1e about the 
subjects' ability to concεptualizε， hypothesize and communicatively construct their 
own realities in ways different from what experimenters or controllers of the 
situation envision. Among the social consequences of such practices are 
reinforcements of a rationality that renders instrumental behavior as a norm, the 
preferential development of control theories of human behavior, a conspicuous 
absence of theories of이pec띠cal.ψ human communication and the virtual silence on 
issues of cognitive autonomy. (Paradoxically, the law requires experimenters with 
human subjects to obtain their consent which presupposes the subjects to 
understand the very controls that prevent them from exercising this abi1ity during 
scientific experimentations--just for the convenience of rendering objectivist 
comparisons and causal or correlational analyses appropriate). 
(3) The observer relies on objectivist comparisons and constructs theories 
without references to thε very processes of human understanding that constitute the 
phenomena being observed. 1 am distinguishing here two cases: 
(3a) Accounting for communication processes in terms of causal, 
correlational or stochastic theories. Since such accounts are not much different 
from accounts for the behavior of tri띠al mechanisms, the metaphorical stone for 
εxamplε， I would argue that theories of this kind also trivialize the communication 
practices being expected of subjects in everyday situations. Indeed, theories 
concerned with information transrnission, message effects, attitude change and those 
relying on metaphors of power and resistance, like the notion of persuasive force, 
leave no place for human agency or human cognition in them. Theories of this kind 
are the basis of a behaviorism that declares understanding irrelevant or a mere 
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figment of the subjects imagination and has led to the educational implementation 
of all kinds of mechanistic concepts of the learner. 
(3b) Focussing attention on large systems and highly abstract accounts of 
communications, social institutions, communication networks or whole cultures. 
Tehranian’s interest in such systems exemplifies this concern. His comparisons 
might seem justified in view of the practical difficulty if not impossibility of 
interacting with systems composed of numerous human constituents. However, 1 
see two problems with objectivist cor매arisons oflarge and abstract social systems. 
(i) The omission of references to the human understandings, discoursive practices 
and pattεrn of communication that constitute the systems being considered justifies 
constructions that have nothing to do with how a system is constituted and de띠es 
the relevance of human involvements. Yet, no culture, no discourse, no human 
communication could be observed without its participants continually recognizing, 
reproducing, practicing and constituting it as such. (ii) Paying mere lip service to 
the importance of cognition and language by assuming them to be invariant and the 
same for all constituents of the systems being compared prohibits accounting for 
most processes of human communication in them, which are largely set in motion by 
cognitive differences. This analytically convenient practice is evident in the 
common assumption that the members of a particular culture think alike in most 
respects, that the speakers of a language must use the same communication codes 
and that the participants of a social system are interchangeable. The class and 
function concepts in sociology are a typical outgrow of this assumption. 1 would 
ar밍le that social systems always are constitutεd by numerous individuals who 
continually redraw socially relevant distinctions and reconstruct what the system is 
for them , their own idiosyncratic understanding being embedded i，α a networkof 
communication practices. In either of the above two omissions, objectivist observers 
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becorne 10st in their own conceptua1izations and the ethnocentrisrn Tehranian 
sought to avoid becornes b1atant1y evident. 
It seerns to rne, by not granting the cornrnunicating hurnans (whose practices 
are being obsεrved， cornpared, exp1ainεd and theorized either individually or as 
rnernbers oflarger socia1 systerns) the sarne cognitive abi1ities that scientific 
observers rnust clairn for thernsε1ves when constructing theories about thern, 
researchers assure for themselves the exclusive privilege to determine what is real. 
Arrned with a detached rnethodo1o망， understanding becomes the providence of 
scientists. And objectifications of the systerns being constructed and cornpared, 
cognitively disable its constituents and make it impossibleψr them to realize their own 
contribution to thern. The theories such cornparisons 1egitirnize rnay be appealing 
for their sirnplicity but they a1so serve those interested in domination and control and 
support techno1ogica1 and cognitive constructions that enforce a widespread 
submission to conditions constructed as real. 
Finally (4), 1 arn again suggesting two re1ated cases. (4a) The observer rnay 
respect thε subjects' cognitive autonorny but does not engage thern in conversations 
concerning the theory proposed about thern. Archeo1ogists, historians and literary 
researchers, having to construct their theories frorn surviving fragrnents of past 
discoursive practices, naturally are confined to this condition. In contrast, 
conversations with individua1 rnernbers of 1iving socia1 systerns cou1d create 
attention to what a scientific theory suggests, stirnu1ate objections and elicit 
e1aborations conductive to and coherent with their practices of living, both 
individually and as rnernbers of 1arger socia1 constructions. In such conversations, 
rnernbers also cou1d becorne aware ofwhat they had not noticed before, change 
their behavior in response and by irnp1ication require that the theory in question be 
reconstructed to reflect the new realities it created. However, failing to engage 
subjects in such negotiations and viabi1itating practices keeps the criteria for accepting 
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a theory entireψ extemal to the system being compared and privileges a scientific 
discourse at the expense o[ the discourse generated withi，η the system. By itself, the 
participants' discourse may be equally deficient. Unlike what ethnomethodology 
claims, entirely emic theories, using entirely internal validity criteria, rarely are as 
insightful about existing practices as when challenged from the outside through 
conversation. In theories that constitute themselves in such conversations the 
participants' understanding becomes recognized and inscribed. In contrast, 
communication theories that emerge out of the received non-participatory 
environments are unlikely able to account [or communication as a negotiated 
phenomenon. At the very best they reflect the workings of a scientific community. 
One can denounce this non-participatory research practice, which is so much 
part of positivist research traditions, as arrogant, elitist, observer-centered, 
authoritarian, undemocratic or whatever. It yields communication theories that 
those theorised about may never know or have no sαy in if they do. Their practical 
applications privilege the designers of communication technologies and their users 
(e.g. in the role of senders) with instrumental intents by providing them predictions 
and instruments o[ control without subjects ’ consent. 
(4b) Regardless of the form a proposed theory may take, the observer is 
interested in generalizations beyond what was either observed or proven viable in 
conversation. Generalizations presume commonalties between what was observed 
and what these observations are assumed to speak about as well. Generalizations 
also leave behind aηything unique, in the case of humans, the contingencies of 
embodied experiences, the subjectivity of understanding and above all, all 
manifestations o[ cognitive autonomy. To summarily dismiss them may be a rather 
heavy human toll to pay. In the first of the four conditions being discussed here, 1 
listed several phenomena and generalizations about them might prove less 
problematic. This is not so in the social domain. Scientific generalizations always 
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are public and general theories of human cornmunication, having to be inserted into 
and survive the vεry process they describe (see proposition four) both claim and 
practice their extendibi1ity beyond the cornmonalities observed or consented to. 1 
am suggesting that by failing to encourage d，ιfsent among those to whom a theory is 
claimed applicable, general theories can impose commonalties where they may not or 
do not need to exist and prevent individuals αrffected by them from exercising their 
cognitive autonomy. Indeed, in the social domain, most generalizations, for example 
concerning cultural norms, social class distinctions, cornmon cornmunication codes, 
sign-functions, shared conventions, social prejudices or institutional constraints tend 
to be constructed as historical facts of sociallife, as super-individual ce.ηainties or as 
self-evident standards, not as comrηunicatively negotiated cognitive constructions. 
Their constructed nature easily is forgotten and the possibility of communicatively 
deconstructing them is suppressed. 
Generalizations also c1aim their territories. Wzthout participation and 
consent, the more general a theory is claimed to be, particularly by scientists not taking 
responsibilities for their own inventions, the larger the territory it covers, the more 
’w싸4ν씨!id값es，쟁pread the suψppreαssion 
abstracαt(ψy that t.μ띠heoαrσy IS S안ta따tεd ， thε lεss likely is it for individuals to see how their own 
constructions could be responsible for it and the more hidden becomes the consequent 
suppression. Because of this, general theories about how cornmunication works,--all 
of which, 1 would claim, reflect but some theorists' cognitive constructions--not only 
validate themselves by forcing subjects ’ submissioη but also lay the foundation of an 
intellectual imperialism that is all the more diffiωlt to overcome as their disowned 
constructions disable reflection. 
Finally, back to the question "is a comparative methodology desirable?" 
With objectivist methodologies in hand, this depends on which side one is on, the 
privileged knower or the generalized and cognitively disabled known. From a 
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constructivist perspective, this depends on whether or not those theorized about are 
entitled and enabled to shape theories concerning them in conversations and 
whether or not the uniqueness of their cognitive autonomy is provided a place in 
their construction. 
Summary 
In the preceding, 1 have argued that human communication is a special kind 
of phenomenon, one that brings its own language into the very picture a theory 
needs to paint and embeds the comparisons this language enables in its very own 
process. This led me to conc1ude that comparisons of human communication 
theories that do justice to the communication processes they c1aim to describe must 
take place and prove their viability in conversations or dialogues that honor the 
cognitive autonomy of their participants and offer each the opportunity to contribute to 
the construction of such theories, at least by visibly practicing their own understanding 
ofthem. 
Whenevεr theories are comparεd and constructed to explain phenomena that 
also lie in the domain of human understanding for those of whom they c1aim to 
speak, ethical considerations become inevitable. This is true for most social 
theories but especially for theories of human communication which can bring forth 
and sustain processes most central to individual self-understanding and the 
construction of society constitutionally involving them. My proposal has been to 
distribute the ethical responsibilities such theories entail by engaging those involved in 
conversations that could comparatively (re)construct them in the practice they 
inform. Abstract and general theories accepted without advice and consent from those 
involved as informants or constituer따 of the system of their concem, can become 
oppressive and support an intellectual imperialism that prevents individuals from 
realizing their own and most precious cognitive autonomy. 
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